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NONVERBAL EXPRESSION

freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct ... as these amendments afford those who communicate ideas by pure speech." It is the idea or content of an
expression which is protected under the Constitution, not the
manner in which it is communicated. 8 If it is the conduct
which the legislature seeks to repress, and not the idea, conduct
may be punished "even though intertwined with expression". 9
Street was convicted not because of what he said, but
how he said it. The statute under which he was convicted
sought not to repress his protests, but to repress conduct made
criminal by the legislature. Although the Street court noted
this distinction it rested its decision on the assertion that the
defendant's conduct might have provoked a breach of the
peace. The decision might well have rested upon the distinction between expression and criminal conduct.
Charles S. Chapel
8
1

See Lusk, supra note 2; Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 316
(1952).
'9 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 563 (1965).

CRIMINAL LAW -INDIGENT
DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO COUNCIL IN MISDEMEANOR CASES
Defendant John De Joseph advised the Connecticut Circuit Court that he was financially unable to employ an attorney and requested court-appointed counsel to aid him in
his defense to a misdemeanor charge. De Joseph argued that
the case of Gideon v. Wainright' had established a right to
court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants. The Supreme
Court there held:
[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
1372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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[Sitate and national constitu-

tions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural
and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair

trials . . . in which every defendant stands equal be-

fore the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has
to face his accusers
2
without a lawyer to assist him.

The Connecticut judge denied De Joseph's request, stating that since the Gideon decision involved a defendant accused of a felony, its command was not applicable to persons charged with a misdemeanor only.3 De Joseph petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to
review his conviction on the ground that he had been denied
his constitutional right to court-appointed counsel, but his petition was denied.4
The reasoning of the Connecticut court in its denial of
De Joseph's request for court-appointed counsel represents
an attitude which is characteristic of many state courts today.3 However, this position seems to be an incorrect interpretation of the defendant's right to court-appointed counsel
when the crime charged is a misdemeanor." Different criteria
are applied among the various states,7 and also between the
2 Id. at

344 (emphasis added).
3 State v. De Joseph, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 982 (1966).
4 De Joseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
6See, e.g., Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364
(1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); State v. Zucconi, 93
N.J. Super. 380, 226 A.2d 16 (App. Div. 1967); City of New
Orleans v. Cook, 249 La. 820, 191 So. 2d 634 (1966); See also
Pizzitola v. State, 374 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
"Compare Comment, The Indigent Defendant's Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 19 Sw. L.J. 593 (1965), with
Kainsar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an
Accused, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 1 (1962).

7 See,

e.g., Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364
(1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); People v. Mallory,
378 MAich. 538, 147 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

state and federal courts." There is a pressing need for a clear
standard governing the right to counsel and for its uniform
application by state and federal courts. The Supreme Court
avoided the opportunity to establish such a guideline in the
De Joseph case and in a similar federal case decided three
months earlier.9
If the premise is accepted that the Gideon decision established that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right,
as opposed to simply the need, to be represented by counsel, 10
then analysis of this premise will obviate any controversy
centering upon the nature of the offense with which the defendant is charged. That is, once the existence of the right is
established, any deprivation of this right is unconstitutional
regardless of whether it is classifed as a felony or a misdemeanor." To conclude that this right is an absolute one, applicable to every criminal act regardless of the degree of severity, would be to ignore the practicalities of criminal law.
The necessity of making a distinction seems clear, but the
present distinction is arbitarily drawn. The felony-misdemeanor line overlooks the important factor of the burden
which a criminal penalty imposes on the defendant. 12 When
viewed in light of the disruptive effect on the defendant's efforts to support his family, operate his business, obtain a new
job, borrow money, and so on, the misdemeanant's nine month
penalty weighs as heavily as the felon's fourteen month penalty. It is obvious that one should have the same constitutional rights as the other.
Another ground upon which the De Joseph decision is to
be criticized stems from the fact that the federal judiciary
8

See, e.g., McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965);
Pizzitola v. State, 374 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
9Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
10 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
"Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 1965).
12 See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 695 n. 12 (1964).
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conforms to standards which often differ from the standards
applied by state courts.13 As part of the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964,14 Congress declared that indigent defendants charged
"[w]ith felonies or misdemeanors, other than petty offenses"
shall be provided counsel in all federal courts. The situation
is made more confusing because the federal courts must appoint counsel in any serious misdemeanor case whereas many
of the state courts are insistent on applying Gideon only in
felony cases. The resulting confusion can best be illustrated
by a comparison of Arbo v. Hegstrom'5 with De Joseph. With
less than ten months difference in the dates of the trials, both
defendants were accused and convicted of the same crime in
Connecticut. Both men were indigent and were tried without
the benefit of court-appointed counsel. The court ruled that
the appointment of counsel for De Joseph was discretionary
and that, therefore, his conviction must be affirmed. 10 After
exhausting his state remedies, however, Norman Arbo petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus
and it was granted. In contrast to the De Joseph holding in the
state court, this federal court in Arbo stated:
[T]he state had an absolute obligation to appoint counsel to aid the accused,
Norman Arbo, in the preparation
17
of his defense.
And so, as a result of the confusion in Connecticut, one defendant remained in jail and the other was released. Mr.
Justice Stewart underlined this inconsistency in his dissent
to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari citing the disparity between Arbo and De Joseph and concluding:
When the meaning of a fundamental constitutional
right depends on which court in Connecticut a person
13 Comment,

supra note 6, at 599-605.
§ 3006A (1964).
15 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966).
16 State v. De Joseph, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 982 (1966).
.7Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397, 400 (D. Conn. 1966).
14U.S.C.
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turns to for redress, I believe it is time for this Court

to intervene.1 8

Another factor which contributes to current uncertain
standards is the variety of meanings and definitions of "misdemeanor" which exist among the several states. Examples
of such differences can be cited in the area of penalties, such
as Arkansas' provision for a three year penalty for a certain
misdemeanor' 9 as compared to the customary penalty of less
than a year: 20 likewise in the -area of major classifications,
such as the crime of adultery which is categorized as a felony
in some states while considered a misdemeanor in others.21
And so, even if the position is taken that the line is to be
drawn between misdemeanors and felonies, it still appears that
the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to Mr. De
Joseph and thereby 'established a uniform standard for the
distinction between what constitutes a felony and what constitutes a misdemeanor.
The existing confusion and uncertainty allow the meaning of "justice" to vary among the different states, and between the state and federal courts. It allows the citizens of
Mississippi to enjoy a freedom 22 that is not provided for a
citizen of Arkansas.2 In short, it allows the meaning of the
United States Constitution to vary from state to state and
18 De Joseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982, 983, denying cert. to
3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752 (1966).
19 AR. STAT. § 41-805 (1964 Replacement).
20
See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 199 (West 1957); 41 ARx. STAT.
ANw.106 (1964 Replacement); 13 APiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1645
(1939); and, OELA. STAT. tit 21, § 10 (1961).
21 Compare 13 ARIz. REV. STAT. § 221 (1939); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (1902); WIs. STAT. ANN. ch 944, § 16 (West
1955); with KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 21 § 907 (Supp. 1963);
and NEW JERsEY STAT. ANN. ch. 88 § 1 (1898).
22 Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 1965).
2

Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
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from court to court. Perhaps the words which best communicate this proposition are those of Mr. Justice Stewart:
[S]urely it is at least our duty to see to it that a vital
guarantee of the United States Constitution
is accorded
24
with an even hand in all the States.
In the final analysis it is submitted that the present
felony-misdemeanor criterion which is applied by the judiciary
systems in determining which indigent defendants will be
afforded the constitutional right of court-appointed counsel
should have been given a critical analysis by the Supreme
Court in light of (1) the concept of the burden imposed on
the defendant by the penalty assessed, and (2) the lack of
uniformity throughout the judiciary system.
Bill V. Wilkinson

24 Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907-909 (dissenting opinion).
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